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Weakness in Numbers: A Brief Introduction
RYAN G. GANZENMULLER†
MATTHEW A. ELDRED††
As modern science and mathematics penetrate the legal
world, statistical analysis has found approval as a source of
evidence and sometimes even truth itself. Whether due to
efficiency, faith, or perhaps even lack of genuine interest,
society seems willing to accept numerical representations of
data as true without any curiosity as to their creation.
Though statistics may seem like hard facts, the legal
community should be thoughtful and wary in consuming
these representations.
The use of statistics differs from traditional evidence in
two main ways. First, statistics are aggregations of
underlying facts, and this aggregation process can conceal
drastic mistakes and personal biases—hiding forever what
might otherwise inspire lively debate. Second, while
traditional evidence illustrates the world as it actually exists,
statistics often fail—or perhaps even attempt—to incorporate
obvious truths about the real world. The first two Articles we
present in this first issue of Volume 63 offer examples of
when reliance on statistics—whether due to a zealous search
for scarce evidence or a religious trust in information
purportedly possessing the cold calculation of science—has
led the legal community astray.
† Editor-in-Chief, Buffalo Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2015, SUNY Buffalo Law
School. Sincere thanks to Matt Eldred for being the inspiring, driving force behind
bringing this lively dialogue into the pages of the Review.
†† Executive Editor, Buffalo Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2015, SUNY Buffalo
Law School. Many thanks to Ryan Ganzenmuller for his unflagging work ethic
and open-mindedness, and to my wife, Nita, for her support and patience.
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In Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s
Conservatives, Todd E. Pettys analyzes a highly publicized
study of the Supreme Court by Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal,
and Christopher Parker. Pettys illustrates how the
aggregation of large amounts of data can conceal blunders
and biases in the statistical process that clearly affect what
purports to be rigorous statistical analysis.1 While it may be
true that small mistakes do not affect a larger outcome, is the
law ever ready to knowingly accept such clear errors? If so,
at what point do such errors become intolerable? We would
argue that known biases or mistakes have no place in the
realm of the law and the search for truth. But if bias is an
inherent part of human nature, can there ever be a statistical
study rigorous enough to indict the most reverend construct
of our legal system?
In P-Values, Priors, and Procedure in Antidiscrimination
Law, Jason R. Bent calls for a “Bayesian revolution” in the
use of statistics in antidiscrimination lawsuits and an end to
the blind faith in a statistic used to prove the value of other
statistics—the “p-value.”2 A Bayesian system would help
expose the follies like the one in the following example: if a
coin is flipped ten times, what are the chances that every flip
would produce a heads? But what if the coin has been
tampered with and has a head on both sides? The coin is
inherently biased in favor of heads, and not knowing this
would produce drastically inaccurate calculations.
Incorporating more information—information about what
really exists in the world—into one’s statistics can make a
highly unlikely event inevitable.
To relate this concept to Pettys’s piece, how does bias in
the judgment of the statistician’s observation protocol affect
the final values he calculates? When coding a close call, is the
statistician flipping a double-headed coin? A Bayesian
system would incorporate known truths about the world into
statistical predictions, thereby at least attempting to bend
1. See Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(2015).
2. See Jason R. Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedure in Antidiscrimination
Law, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2015).
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them to the world rather than induce the study’s consumers
to bend the world to the statistics.
In addition to Pettys’s Article in this January issue of
Volume 63, the Buffalo Law Review is pleased to host a set of
four Responses in our subsequent April issue. Christina L.
Boyd,3 Timothy M. Hagle,4 Carolyn Shapiro,5 and Edward
Whelan6 comment on the state of empirical legal studies and
the divide between Pettys and Epstein, showcasing the
opinions of leading scholars in the area to round out our
discussion of this salient topic.
Legal advocates and scholars are, by nature, hungry for
information. Statistics promise to feed that hunger with
infallibility, simplicity, and impartiality. But that
information is sometimes only empty calories, and a
confident statistician may wind up practicing alchemy.7 The
practice of law—with life, liberty, and property on the line—
should not settle for mere mirages or fool’s gold. At a time
when so many already believe the game is fixed, why are we
increasing our reliance on tools that make even more efficient
mistakes and conceal even more biases? We must seek the
truth in the world directly, lest we find the scales of justice
replaced with loaded dice. Who would care to risk one’s job or
life on the flip of a two-headed coin?

3. Christina L. Boyd, In Defense of Empirical Legal Studies, 63 BUFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2015).
4. Timothy M. Hagle, Two Worlds, Neither Perfect: A Comment on the Tension
Between Legal and Empirical Studies, 63 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2015).
5. Carolyn Shapiro, Numbers, Motivated Reasoning, and Empirical Legal
Scholarship, 63 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2015).
6. Edward Whelan, A Bad Proposal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2015).
7. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).

